The last battles

The Central Powers did not manage to defeat Italy through the offensive in autumn 1917. They realized that the time was in favor of the Entente because of the going to war of the USA; it was necessary for them to find a rapid solution of the conflict through great strategic offensives. That was the decisive reason of the Austrian offensive in June 1918 that was prepared with a lot of means along with technical and moral expedients; it led to have confidence in the success.
The Austro-Hungarian operational plan considered: doing the main effort on Brenta to break rapidly the mountain front; reaching the plain and encircling the units that defended the Piave; simultaneous attack of the Armies Group of the Isonzo towards Treviso-Mestre, with the Bacchiglione line as principal target. An attack on Tonale along with deflections in the Giudicane and in Val Lagarina had to precede the other operations in order to fasten part of the Italian forces. This operational plan was logical and it would have permitted a merger in the plain for the Austro-Hungarian Army after only one day of fighting; but it was changed into two attacks carried out through almost equivalent forces because of the antagonism between Conrad (the mountain sector Commander) and Boroevic (the Armies Group of the Veneto plain): both of them wanted the honour​ for the decisive action.

At the dawn of 12^th June there was a violent artillery fire in the Italian positions of the 7^th Army. It was the beginning of a demonstrative action on the west of Astico, entrust to the 10^th Army of the General Krobatin; through it the Austrian Command, in the three days expected by the operational plan, intended to settle the Italian forces on the west of Garda and to conquer good positions for future operations in Lombardia. The incisive fire of the counter-preparation and barrage by the Italian artilleries, along with the intense reaction of the machine-guns, wore off any desires by the Austrians that attacked in vain on the front of Tonale the following day.
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The diversion attack was a failure. At 3.00 of 15^th June the Austrian artillery started to bomb intensely from the Astico front to the sea. But the fire of the Italian counter-preparations had already carried on violently. The Austro-Hungarians, that had believed to surprise the enemy, had to undergo a tactical surprise and the effects immediately revealed: the bombing, even if it was violent, was inaccurate and casual; the infantries, that moved for the attack between 7.00 and 8.00, did not have the force that the Austrian Command had trusted in. On 15^th the troops of the 11^th Austro-Hungarian Army would have broken the Italian lines, from Val d’Assa to Val Frenzela; but all the attacks broke against the line of resistance. The Austrian had the same destiny between Brenta and Piave. In the area of Piave, that was divided into two sectors by the Austro-Hungarian Command (corresponding to the Armies deployed there), Montello became very important and almost all the ​forces of the 6^th Austro-Hungarian Army were concentrated there. The Austrians used teargases and smoke bombs that constituted thick fog more than 20 m high; in that way they managed to pass towards the right bank of the river, even if there was a strong defensive reaction. The opened channel permitted the Austro-Hungarian troops to conquer the salient of Montello up to its south edge, but on the contrary they failed in the conquest of Nervesa towards the bridges of Priula. In the evening the attack had already been limited. In the other sector of Piave, the Austrians managed to create two small bridgeheads at about 9.00 p.m., precisely in Fagaré and Musile. In general, the first day of the Austro-Hungarian offensive did not have important results.

On 16^th, the Austro-Hungarian Army performed a defensive attitude on the mountain front and it launched attacks on Piave in order to enlarge the bridgeheads. But the Italian reaction was prompt and efficient. On 17^th, on the uplands of Asiago, there were only artillery duels. On the left and in the center of the sector of Montello the conflict stopped while on the right side it flared up all day long. On the lower Piave, an Austrian powerful attack (left from Zenson and from the bay of Gonfo) managed to connect the two bridgeheads of Ponte di Piave and S.Dona. But actually, the obstinacy of the Austro-Hungarian Army in repeating its attacks to pave the way along Treviso-Mestre, it weakened its forces. In the evening of the 17^th every pressure ended on Grappa, the attacks on Montello had been limited and the Piave front was firmly controlled by the Italian Departments. On the 18^th the Austrian Command, with a strong effort, employed its reserves for a new attack that did not lead to any advantages. The failure of the imperial Army in the mountain sector, the impossibility to break the lines in the Piave sector and the use of its forces in four days of conflict determined the decision of the Italian Superior Command to start the counteroffensive on the 19^th. In the following days, the power of the artillery fire and the sacrifice of the Italian infantry caused the definitive collapse of the Austrian Army that, during the night of the 23^rd, began its retreat over the Piave. The Italian Army took advantage of the success of the local actions, lasted until 15^th July, that permitted to re-establish and improve the situation before the Austrian offensive, particularly along the lower Piave. The battle of the Piave, in which 150 000 Austrians and 90 ​​000 Italians died, was a great Italian victory: it was the first in 1918 by one of the Entente Armies and it was a sign of the victorious end of war. For the Austrians it represented an inexorable defeat that used up their last forces by shattering their hopes for a victory. During the summer of 1918, General Foch renewed several times to General Diaz the request for launching an offensive on the uplands; there were also pressures by the French Ambassador in Rome towards the Italian Government and by the Italian Government towards the Superior Command. Diaz resisted because they could not repeat the error made in the battle of Ortigara; on the other hand it was appropriate waiting for the right moment before carrying out a resolved offensive. Since mid-July the German Superior Command had lost the initiative in the French theater of war and the allied offensives forced the German Army to the retreat, without losing its compactness.

Between 16^th and 19^th September the “Armée d’Orient”, in which there was the 35^th Italian Division, determined the collapse of the German-Bulgarian front in the Balkans; on 29^th September the armistice between the Allies and the Bulgaria was signed. The Italian Superior Command realized the possibility to break the enemy front in the area between the two Austrian Armies (the 5^th and the 6^th) in Piave, on the director of Vittorio Veneto, an important logistic centre along the operational line of the 6^th Austro-Hungarian Army. After having broken the front and separated the two enemy Armies, the Italian Forces, heading towards Feltre, would have circumvented the Austrian troops on Grappa and they would have developed the maneuver going to Val Sugana and to Cadore. Finally a real battle for the breaking through of the lines! Gabriele D’Annunzio defined it: “the roman wedge that cut the enemy front into two big sections”. The maneuver would have had to start on 16^th October but, because of the overflow of the Piave, it started on 24^th October. This delay permitted to perfect the operational plan; also the 4^th Army of Grappa was ordered to launch an offensive contributing to the main action entrust to the 8^th Army and diverting the attention of the enemy towards the plain where the main action was expected. Therefore the 4^th Army began the battle and it continued its attacks until 27^th October getting only a success, that is wearing out the Austro-Hungarian forces with a few supplies.

In the nigh between 26^th and 27^th, the 8^th Army, the 12^th Army (headed by the French General Graziani and composed by 1 French division and 3 Italian divisions) and the 10^th Army (headed by the English General Cavan and composed by 2 English divisions and 2 Italian divisions) poured the bridges on the Piave and they crossed the river. The attack was so impetuous that forced the Command of the 6^th Austro-Hungarian Army to order the retreat on Monticano on 28^th October.

On 30​​^th​ October the 8^th Army occupied Vittorio Veneto with its advanced guards; the 12^th Army passed the narrows of Quero towards Feltre; the 10^th crossed Monticano towards Sacile. In the evening the Austrian General Weber went to the Italian Superior Command to negotiate the surrender. The negotiations were not sent because the Austro-Hungarian Government wanted to sign an armistice and not a complete capitulation.

During the negotiation the operations continued and on 31^st October the Austrian troops of Grappa gave up to the impetuous action of the 4^th Army that decided to move towards Arsié; the 12^th Army went to Feltre; the 8^th Army led in the valley of Piave at Ponte delle Alpi; the 10^th Army, supported by the 3^rd Army, reached Livenza and the cavalry reached Tagliamento; the 6^th Army moved along Val Sugana in order to reach Trento-Egna.

On 3^rd November the 1^st Army entered Trento; the other Armies reached their objectives; the cavalry went to Palmanova, Udine, Station for Carnia and Gradisca, while a specific contingent disembarked in Trieste.

The night of 3^rd November the armistice of Villa Giusti was signed: on 4^th November 1918 at 3.00 p.m. the hostilities on the Italian front were stopped. In the battle of Vittorio Veneto Italy did not only defeat “one of the most powerful Armies in the world” but it also caused the complete fall of the Empire of Hapsburgs. The Italian effort was enormous, but the era of the Italian Risorgimento ended with the disappearance of the centuries-old enemy as well as the achievement of the natural borders.